

Commission of Inquiry
into the Deployment of
Canadian Forces to Somalia



Commission d'enquête
sur le déploiement des
Forces canadiennes en Somalie

CANADA

National Defence Headquarters Centre for Decision

a study prepared for
the Commission
of Inquiry into
the Deployment of
Canadian Forces
to Somalia

Douglas L. Bland



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Armed Forces
CFHQ	Canadian Forces Headquarters
DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
MND	Minister of National Defence
MRG	Management Review Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA	<i>National Defence Act</i>
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
QR&O	Queen's Regulations and Orders
RCGO	Royal Commission on Government Organization
UN	United Nations

Foreword

National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) is at the centre of defence policy making, command of the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) and defence administration. It is simultaneously the government's instrument for controlling defence policy and directing the armed forces. Therefore, NDHQ is not only a legitimate target for close investigation by anyone concerned with defence policy and operational outcomes, it ought to be the critical and primary focus of their attention.

In Canada, the three principal aspects of national defence — political direction, command and administration — necessarily overlap to some degree, but Parliament has set out, in law, boundaries that act as a check and balance between those charged with each function. At times, these boundaries may be obscured by complex issues, but no permanent harm can occur as long as political leaders remain at the helm. A far more dangerous situation can develop when one authority captures an adjacent territory and assumes duties unintended by Parliament. In this situation, responsibility and accountability are never clear. It is, therefore, a critical political responsibility to maintain boundaries and to prevent individuals or groups within the defence establishment from gaining position and authority beyond their legal mandates. This study explores the crucial aspect of civil-military relations encompassed in the dynamic among policy making, command and administration by focussing attention on NDHQ, the centre for defence decisions in Canada.

The study refers to the principal reports on government and the organization of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence (DND). These reports together trace the history of the ideas and decisions that brought NDHQ into being, and the lines of accountability in the headquarters today cannot be fully understood without reference to them. The most important of these primary sources are listed at the beginning of the bibliography.

This paper also makes considerable reference to the *National Defence Act* and regulations. Here the author is indebted to the advice and counsel of Brigadier-General (retired) James Simpson, Judge Advocate General, 1972-1976. The final interpretation, however, of all studies and the laws and regulations applicable to the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence are the responsibility of the author alone.

Douglas L. Bland
December 1995

Four Steps Forward, One Step Back

STEP ONE: STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT

The French premier George Clemenceau (“the tiger”) is quoted as saying in 1917 that “war is too important a matter to be left to the military.” The continuing relevance and importance of this notion was highlighted in 1994 by Parliament’s Special Joint Committee On Defence which reported that “there was one matter on which we agreed...that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the scrutiny and development of defence policy” (Canada, 1994: 57). NDHQ is, indeed, the centre for policy formulation, operational command of the CF and defence administration. But because it is an assertive and not a benign institution, it resists change. This opinion is supported by experienced senior officers and defence officials who complain that the institution they thought they controlled is largely unregulated (Theriault, 1994: 15). Since 1980, NDHQ has been occupied by six chiefs of defence and three deputy ministers, yet the problems identified in the early 1980s remain in place today. Organizational changes alone will not change NDHQ. Regaining Parliament’s control over defence policy and the operations of the CF, therefore, demands that Parliament, assisted by competent officers and officials, change the nature of NDHQ.

Most observers acknowledge that a comprehensive program aimed at reforming the defence establishment — even one centred on the law, organization and ethics — will not advance rapidly or completely without political direction. Therein lies the dilemma for defence reformers in Canada. NDHQ became an assertive organization and has resisted change principally because defence ministers have not always actively supervised their portfolios. The first reform, therefore, must be a reform of Parliament’s attitude toward its responsibility for national defence.

There have been many attempts to change NDHQ. They have all failed because they focussed on organization and missed the essence of the

problem that resides in the structure. Regaining control of NDHQ requires more than the reorganization of a few lines and boxes on a chart; actually, those lines and boxes are hardly a priority at all. As defence reformers in other nations have discovered, changing defence structures demands an examination of founding concepts and the redirection of human behaviour more than an organizational fix.

Writing about the American experience, Edward Luttwak noted that "the belief that the true workings of complicated institutions can be seriously improved by tinkering with their formal structure is one more symptom of the 'administrator's delusion'; but after a great many new letterheads have been reprinted and many new signs provided for office doors, one usually discovers that the real problems persist" (Luttwak, 1985: 276). Changing NDHQ to overcome its principal problems requires a multifaceted reform of the defence establishment directed by political leaders and followed by a comprehensive restructuring of the mechanisms for political control, national command and administration of defence policy and the armed forces.

The aim of the reforms suggested here is to segregate the power that has accumulated in NDHQ since 1972. Specifically, the intent should be to separate and make distinct — but not to isolate — responsibilities for policy making, military command and defence administration. Once this segregation is complete, Parliament will regain control of defence policy and accountability for the control and administration of the CF and DND will be unambiguous. Reaching these objectives however, will require Parliament to lead three main initiatives.

Parliament must reassert the legal basis for defence organization, separate military command from defence department administration and insist on an ethically directed decision-making process in the armed forces and DND. There is no need to rewrite the *National Defence Act*. But Parliament should demand of itself, officers and officials that the defence establishment conform to the spirit and to the letter of the Act.

Although some individuals fear the segregation of officers and officials into two major staffs believing it will cause friction in the defence establishment, cost a great deal and ruin co-operation, there is no evidence to support these predictions. Anyway, segregating the CF and DND staffs need not create such problems. There is a degree of flexibility in the NDA about who might be employed in support of the CF and DND, but the CDS and the Deputy Minister ought to have their own separate and distinct staffs appropriate to their responsibilities.

The NDA contains other organizational directions intended to strengthen the hand of the Minister and to reinforce accountability in the CF and DND and these must be maintained in any reform of the defence establishment. Reforms should confirm, for instances, the place of the Judge Advocate General directly under the Minister of National Defence. It should also reinforce the position of the Minister of National Defence and enhance Parliament's role in defence matters by making provisions for a committee of the Senate and the House of Commons to play an active part in the direction of policy and the CDS.¹ Finally, political leaders must insist that ministers, officers and officials adhere to laws regarding military organization, command authority and discipline (among other things) as well as the terms of reference and lines of authority meant to differentiate the powers and authority of the Minister of National Defence, the CDS and the Deputy Minister. Parliament must be attentive to its duties.

STEP TWO: CONFIRM THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DEFENCE STRUCTURE

The NDA sets out two separate, but related entities, DND and the CF over which the Minister of National Defence presides, aided by the Deputy Minister and the CDS who have variously related, but separate, responsibilities for the DND and the CF respectively. They are independently accountable to the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence for the management of DND and the "control and administration" of the CF respectively. The CDS is also accountable to the Governor General and, from time to time, responsible directly to premiers of the provinces (and not to the Prime Minister) for certain operations of the CF in "aid of the civil powers." In effect, the defence of Canada — the product of policy, command and administration — is a shared responsibility.

While some might perceive this arrangement as untidy and ambiguous, this perception fails to appreciate the intent of the arrangement. The NDA is intended to provide checks and balances on those who have access to the power inherent in the armed forces. It attempts to address the four tenets of civil-military relations in modern states in keeping with the organization of authority and accountability that fall out of the NDA, i.e., it places the CF under the control of civilians elected to Parliament; restricts the use of the CF by the government of the day; provides clear instructions for and an instrument to maintain discipline in the CF; and

guards the prerogatives of ministers to decide defence policy and to direct the armed forces. The NDA also clearly shows that the government is responsible for the formulation of national policy, the CDS is responsible for the command of the CF and the Deputy Minister is responsible for the public administration of the defence department. Ambiguity only arises when politicians, officers or officials permit it by, for instance, confusing shared responsibility for national defence with collegial responsibility for its various aspects.

Although the Minister of National Defence "presides" over DND he or she is not part of the department. Ministers usually maintain an office within the department from which they conduct ministerial business and another office on Parliament Hill for constituent business. The Deputy Minister may act as a political adviser to the Minister and usually provides support to the Minister's office. The relationship, however, always depends on the idiosyncrasies of the Minister. What is germane to this paper is the fact that although the CF and DND are separate statutory entities, the Minister of National Defence remains responsible and accountable for the activities of the CDS and the Deputy Minister (see Molot, 1994: 276).

The NDA provides for a department of defence but it is largely silent regarding the organization of the department. The Act only stipulates that there shall be a minister, a deputy minister, no more than three associate deputy ministers, a Judge Advocate General and, possibly, an associate minister.² Traditionally, the department has been organized according to Treasury Board and other regulations under the Deputy Minister into three main branches: finance, civilian personnel management and defence procurement.

The Deputy Minister requires a staff and procedures to assist the Minister of National Defence, to aid the CDS, and to fulfil his or her many departmental duties. It is important to recall that the Deputy Minister's duties in relation to the CF are customary and do not fall out of the NDA. Some might contend that the Deputy Minister's most pressing obligations come from acts of Parliament dealing with financial control and the employment of public servants. These ancillary and supporting responsibilities are critical to the CF, especially as they relate to government wide operations, and the Deputy Minister needs support staff to meet them.

Parliament, by section 18 of the NDA, made the CDS responsible for the control and administration of the CF subject to the regulations and, as noted previously, "under the direction of the minister." But the CDS's responsibilities are not delegated from the Minister. The Act gives the

CDS direct authority within the CF, except in a few unique instances. While the NDA provides that the CF shall consist of three "components" (regular, reserve and special forces) the detailed organization of the armed forces is left mostly to the discretion of the Minister and the CDS. The Deputy Minister has no authority in this area whatsoever, although he or she might provide advice on the financial implications of the organization of the CF to the Minister and the CDS.

The structure of the defence establishment before 1972 followed precisely the letter and the spirit of the NDA. It was composed of the Minister and two entities, DND and the CF, each with an identifiable head. Furthermore, each had staff and line elements designed to service the particular needs of their respective heads. This structure not only reflected the provisions of the law, but it also provides Parliament with an unambiguous picture of responsibility and accountability in the defence establishment. Any proposals to reform the current defence establishment in Canada should aim to replicate this clarity.

STEP THREE: REFORM THE STRUCTURE FOR COMMAND

Clearly, the CDS cannot begin to meet all the complex responsibilities unaided and, therefore, the first CDS organized his own headquarters, CFHQ, to advise and help him in 1964. That headquarters evolved over time, but always contained military branches for intelligence, operational planning, logistics planning and personnel administration. CFHQ was solely responsible to the CDS and was the mechanism through which the CDS exercised command and control of the CF. The CDS was supported and authority delegated to subordinate officers, in accordance with the NDA, through a traditional military system of command (Bland, 1995: 71-84).

Military command, as already discussed, is a complex and difficult activity. While few would agree with Brooke Claxton that military command is "almost mystical," most would agree that to exercise command well requires training, experience and sound judgment. Command by a single man on horseback, however, long ago passed into history and even small armed forces and seemingly simple operations present senior commanders with complicated problems. A well trained and exercised military staff is critical if commanders are to plan and control modern military operations successfully. Though the CDS might only occasionally direct military operations in a conflict, he or she must organize, train and practise a national central staff to assist in such circumstances.

The reform of the CF system of command and staff, even if there were no wider reform of the defence establishment, ought to be pursued vigorously. A program for command and staff reform ought to be developed around three main ideas. First, it should aim at developing a cadre of CF officers of a higher loyalty separated from service preferences and direction. Second, these officers must be provided with an appropriate education and opportunities to train realistically in their primary duties. Finally, advancement and influence in the command and staff stream must be based on true merit and intellectual achievement.

Command, as noted previously, demands high ethical standards. Therefore, any military reform must not only identify this ethical component, but it must install a means to discover and remove any contradiction between declared ethical standards and those actually practised. It is particularly important to draw the command ethic from Canadian social norms, laws governing armed forces and customs of military service. Furthermore, this command ethic must be introduced to officers early in their careers and reinforced through subsequent and continual training, by disciplining officers who transgress the code and by the example of leaders.

Canada, perhaps for the first time in its history, must take sovereign responsibility for the armed forces it deploys on any mission, as part of any organization, in any part of the world. The seemingly easy days of alliance are over and experience shows that no government and no CDS can allow the CF to deploy overseas except under unambiguous national command. Former CDS, General de Chastelain, concluded in 1994 that because Canada is more willing to accept military missions on its own, "we are going to have to be able to stand on our own...and command multi-service operations a long way from home" (as quoted in Bland, 1995: 207). This means that CF officers must independently assess international situations and make plans to support and control units on such operations based on orders and regulations derived from Canadian interests and principles. Achieving this capability will require a rebirth of the military profession in Canada. The CF will need a unified system of command, a rigorous process for the selection of commanders based on true military merit and a system of professional education suited to Canadian circumstances.

STEP FOUR: REBUILD THE ETHICAL FOUNDATION

Above all else, however, taking command of the CF must begin with the reform of individuals. That is the first challenge for the officer corps and

it begins with a personal commitment to fulfil the Sovereign's "special trust" and the expectations of Canadians.

No one imposed an ethical crisis on the CF. It arose gradually, but perceptibly, as compromises broke the defining spirit of the armed forces. In Canada, the external code was contradicted by internal practices. As Gabriel records of the American military, criticism became equated with disloyalty and officers stood by as the careers of outspoken comrades went down in flames, arbitrariness replaced fairness and brotherhood was abandoned to self-centred careerism. The commander of one Canadian brigade charged that "there is a widespread belief [in the army] that political agendas and careerism have replaced leadership in the defence hierarchy."³ Worse, senior officers came to be seen as loners bent on avoiding responsibility and attributing every failing to outside forces. Inaction, indeed, does sometimes speak louder than words.

The Canadian officer's ethos is not hard to describe nor to meet. The code is declared in bold letters above the entrance to The Royal Military College: "Truth, Duty, and Valour." What officers "promise to do" is written on the commissioning scroll handed to every officer by Her Majesty. She commands officers "to exercise and well discipline in arms" their subordinates and "to keep them in good order and discipline." No officer can be faulted if he or she lives to this simple code and strives diligently to meet the Sovereign's commands. It is not perfection in these goals that is important, but the promise to live by them that separates the ethical officer from the mere person in uniform.

Officers of unquestioned integrity bonded by uncompromising professional standards and truly loyal to Canada above all else are unassailable. This high moral ground provides protection from those who would usurp the military's place in society. A strong rampart built on intellectual curiosity and intellectual achievement bars assaults from those who would invade the professional circle. Leaders accustomed to sacrifice who set clear professional examples will find their difficult duties amply supported by many willing hands. Being true to the profession of arms may never provide officers with unlimited political support for every military cause, but it will free officers from the tyranny of partisan politics.

Only CF officers who have taken command of themselves can take command of the armed forces of Canada. No one can force the Canadian officer corps to advance to the high ground of professional responsibility. CF officers must carry this banner forward on their own initiative. Reaching that high ground, however, must be the primary duty of every officer in the years ahead.

ONE STEP BACK: REDISCOVER THE ESSENCE OF UNIFICATION

The mechanism for controlling the armed forces cannot be separated from the mechanism for defence policy making, commanding the CF and managing defence administration. Whenever there is disharmony between the mechanisms for civil control of the armed forces and the system for the general management and command of those forces, civil control usually suffers. This is the lesson from the era of the Cuba missile crisis and Paul Hellyer's unification battles and, apparently, from the Somalia affair. In each case, but for different reasons, the central machinery of the defence establishment became disconnected from government and, concurrently, authority and accountability within the defence establishment was discovered to be ambiguous and inappropriate to the needs of government. The answer to these problems after 1963 (when Hellyer became Minister of National Defence) was to enhance control and clarify accountability by simplifying the lines of authority within the defence structure. After 1972, however, the structure devolved under "collegial leadership" into what has been called "institutional ambiguity." The step back proposed here is a step in the direction of clarifying authority through purposeful simplification in accordance with the NDA and regulations.

The development of a strong national defence establishment in Canada during the Cold War era was inhibited by service sovereignty, the strategy of commitments and by confusion about civil-military relations. These three factors surreptitiously supported each other; the services relish the independent missions that the commitments provided because they reinforced service fiefdoms and autonomy. Confusion and ignorance about political responsibility for national command arrangements in the alliances along with political indifference, depreciated the issue. Thus, powerful service centres, Canada's loyalty to their commitments and the neglect of national command combined to strengthen the hinterland of command at the expense of the centre. These failings were the main cause for the confusion of command and the civil-military relations crisis in Canada during the Cuban missile crisis (Haydon, 1993).

Even in 1964, NDHQ still reflected the sovereignty of the service chiefs. The Chiefs of Staff Committee continued in its dull ways and the service chiefs routinely bypassed the Committee whenever they felt their interests demanded the direct attention of the Minister of National Defence. "It was," in the opinion of General Guy Simonds "a sheer waste of time" (as quoted in Bland, 1995: 42). The several "joint staff" committees that

attempted to find a consensus on issues and policies touching more than one service had no authority, and the members of the committees acted predictably to protect their service's interests on all important questions. NDHQ was missing the "final piece of machinery" for national strategic planning. There was no authoritative centre supported by a unified national staff that could relate external strategic factors and political and technological changes, "to the aims of Canadian national policy in any systematic fashion" (DND, 1963: 174).

Hellyer's reforms attacked this ineffective malaise directly. The CDS would be the centre of military advice and direction and would be supported by his own staff in CFHQ. The new military headquarters had no direct attachment to the Minister's or Deputy Minister's staffs nor any pretence to serve the Defence Council. CFHQ had only one other responsibility and that was to support and respond to commands.

Officers who were developing CFHQ in 1964, and it was a process controlled almost totally by the military, started from a classic military point of view. They understood the "functions" of the headquarters to be planning and decision making in six broad fields: intelligence, strategic planning, force development, requirements programming, training and operations, and logistics planning. Nevertheless, CFHQ was the CDS's headquarters. It provided a staff the CDS could use to direct the planning and operations of the CF, and there was little confusion or ambiguity within CFHQ concerning the unified staff's first responsibilities.

The CDS also controlled every aspect of CF operations and logistics and his advice prevailed in requirements and budgeting discussions before ministers. It is reasonable to suggest that had CFHQ been given time to mature and had the training system produced a corps of CF general staff officers, then the central headquarters would have become the long sought after and necessary instrument for the unified direction of the CF and national defence policy.

The integration of the armed forces and the restructuring of the headquarters did not greatly influence the civil service component of DND between 1964 and 1971. Indeed, the Deputy Minister's organization remained much as it had since 1950. Civil servants were organized to perform accounting and audit functions in the department and to assist the service chiefs in the preparation and presentation of estimates and budgets. Hellyer accepted the Glassco Commission's recommendation to increase the power of civilians in the department, but only as one of his advisers. "No thought [was] given to revising the concept of the role of

the civilians in the organization except indirectly, inasmuch as unification might appear to strengthen the civilian headquarters component by making 'the odds against them more even'" (Kronenberg, 1973: 61).

The 1972 restructuring of CFHQ and the departmental headquarters into NDHQ at least retarded Hellyer's efforts and many of the pre-1964 habits returned. Operational control of the forces floundered and authority and accountability in the defence establishment were blurred once again. Collegial decision making and defence by committees, the bane of the pre-unification era, returned. When this situation was coupled to political inattention, NDHQ, like the service-centred headquarters, became a bureaucratic arena where defence policy making, command and administration came under the control of personalities and adroit interest groups. Accountability was the first victim in this uneven contest.

Hellyer's reforms were prompted by serious concerns for civil-military relations in Canada and he strengthened the involvement and participation of the government in defence matters to overcome the problem. Macdonald's reforms, on the other hand, stemmed from administrative worries and he diminished political control of the armed forces in favour of civil service control of procedures. In the confusion wrought by the partial implementation of the MRG recommendations, real civil control of the defence establishment withered. Clearly, the 1972 MRG based restructuring of the defence establishment is as wanting as was the pre-unification service-centred system.

The government, therefore, should begin the reform of the defence establishment in 1996 by directing the Minister of National Defence to take one step back — to reject the 1972 concepts of the MRG and to embrace once more the ideas brought forward by Paul Hellyer in 1964. That is to say, the government should build a strong and effective mechanism for defence policy planning, command and defence administration based on an office for the Minister, a Canadian Forces Headquarters and a departmental headquarters. In this way authority and accountability will be obvious and the control of the Canadian Forces by Parliament, at least, manageable.

Notes

CHAPTER ONE — INTRODUCTION

- 1 The word “parliament” is meant here as any national representative body having supreme legislative powers within the state.
- 2 See for instance, Kernahan and Langford, 1990; Kernahan, 1972; Stevens, 1978; and Santos, 1969.
- 3 In this study, the term “defence establishment” refers to the combined entities of the Minister and his or her office, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

CHAPTER TWO — THE BASIC CONCEPTS

- 1 “Civil” means control in accordance with laws exercised by civilians elected to Parliament, whereas “civilian” could mean control by anyone not enrolled in the armed forces, e.g., public servants.
- 2 On the concept of shared responsibilities, see Bland, 1995: 127-173.
- 3 *The National Defence Act*, R.S., 1985, c. N-5, updated to January 1991, (hereinafter, NDA) article 14.
- 4 Ibid. Interpretations.
- 5 *Constitution Act 1867*, article 10.
- 6 NDA, part II, article 18(2).
- 7 NDA, part II, article 18(2).
- 8 On the western experience and history of integrated defence ministries see, for example, McNamara, 1968; Stacey, 1970; Enthoven and Smith, 1971; Kronenberg, 1973; Martin, 1975; Johnson, 1980; Beckett and Gooch, 1981; and Art et al., 1985.
- 9 See *Interpretations Act*.
- 10 The term, “operational arts,” comes from the military theory of the former Soviet Union and has been taken into the western military lexicon. It means generally, “the practice of preparing and conducting

contemporary operations” somewhere between grand strategy and low level tactics. See Savkin, 1972. An American view holds that officers are “managers of violence.” See Janowitz, 1960.

CHAPTER THREE — THE LAW AND THE DEFENCE MINISTRY

- 1 These regulations, as prescribed in NDA, sections 12 and 13, can be made by the Governor in Council, the Minister or the Treasury Board.
- 2 NDA, part II, section 14.
- 3 See Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee On Bill No. 133, “An Act Respecting National Defence,” *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*; especially No. 1, 23 May 1950.
- 4 Two of the main acts are the *Financial Administration Act* and the *Interpretation Act*.
- 5 NDA, *supra* note 3, s 17(1). Subsection 17(2) provides that units and other elements may be “embodied” in such of the components (regular, reserve or special) as the Minister may direct.
- 6 Under QR&O article 2.08(1)(b), the CDS may exercise the Minister’s powers whenever he considers it necessary to do so by reason of “training requirements or operational necessity,” provided that it is not a permanent reallocation of units to a command or formation as noted in QR&O article 2.08(2).
- 7 NDA, section 277 provides that the attorney general (or equivalent) of a province may requisition the CDS for the call-out of the Canadian Forces in aid of the civil power, but only to quell a riot or other disturbance of the peace beyond the capacity of the civil powers. See also sections 275, 279 and 280.
- 8 Occasionally, this has been set down in written directions for domestic matters such as the *Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions*, P.C. 1993-624, 30 March 1993, the *Penitentiary Assistance Order-in-Council*, P.C. 1975-131, 23 January 1975 and the *1976 Olympic Games Order-in-Council*, P.C. 1976-1735, 6 July 1976.

CHAPTER FOUR — THE DECISION MAKERS

- 1 These descriptions are based in part on the NDA and on interviews conducted in NDHQ. They also reflect interpretations made by DND officials from time to time concerning the relationship among the Minister of National Defence, Deputy Minister and CDS. Readers are cautioned to use only the NDA for formal terms of reference as some DND documents include descriptions that are of uncertain validity.

- 2 NDA, section 14. A basic rule of construction in legislative drafting is that a change in wording is deemed the same as a change of intention. It follows that the Minister has not been given “control” of the CF, but may give general “direction” to the CDS as to how the CDS is to “control” the CF.
- 3 *Constitution Acts 1867*, article 15. See also House of Commons, Bill 133: 40-41.

CHAPTER FIVE — COMMAND

- 1 NDA, *supra* note 3, Chapter 3, this study, section 19. This section must be read with section 49 of the NDA.
- 2 Emphasis added. An “officer” means a person holding Her Majesty’s commission, an officer cadet or any person pursuant to law attached or seconded as an officer to the CF. NDA, section 2, Interpretations.
- 3 QR&O articles 1.14, 1.15 and 1.16.
- 4 The Minister of National Defence may “approve” of any officer (of or above the rank of colonel serving outside Canada) to do anything that may be done by the CDS.
- 5 QR&O article 3.21.
- 6 QR&O article 111.05(c).
- 7 NDA, article 2, Interpretations.
- 8 NDA, article 83.
- 9 It is an offence to issue unlawful orders.
- 10 QR&O article 4.20.
- 11 The term belongs to Stephen Harris, 1988.
- 12 Canada, House of Commons, *Hansard, Parliamentary Debates*, 8 May 1964: 3068.
- 13 Interviews, Ottawa 1992 and 1993.

CHAPTER SIX — A SYSTEM IN TROUBLE

- 1 See, for example, Newman, 1983; Hasck, 1987; Bland, 1986/87: 26-31; Bland, 1987b: 527-549; Bland, 1989b: 3-16; and Walker, 1991.
- 2 DND, 1980a. For a detailed assessment of the Report and its background see, Bland, 1987a: 122-124; and Bland, 1995: 101-121.
- 3 For example, Colonel George Oehring reported in late 1994 that the army suffers from a “loss of confidence and trust” in its leaders. DND, LFC 5760-1 (G1), 5 December 1994.

- 4 See, for example, the running battle between DND and the so-called "soldiers' journal," *Esprit de Corps*, especially volumes 4/2 and 4/8.
- 5 The defence white paper of 1987 is not unique in this regard. Few such papers have ever been the actual basis for policy for long. See Bland, 1989b: 3-16.
- 6 For an assessment of this period see Bland, 1995: 252-260.
- 7 A sense of this frustration (and the need to remove it) is captured in the comments of the CDS, General Jean Boyle, who, soon after taking office, remarked that the army is ill-equipped and that he would not support requests from the government "to go into a high intensity theatre." *The Globe and Mail*, Tuesday, 13 February 1996: A1.
- 8 DND, NDHQ, "Program Evaluation: Command And Control," volume 7.
- 9 For a complete examination of the MRG period see Bland, 1987b: 527-549.
- 10 Confidential interview, Ottawa, December 1995.

CHAPTER SEVEN -- FOUR STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK

- 1 The Special Joint Committee On Canada's Defence Policy made bold recommendations concerning Parliament's role in overseeing defence establishment and defence policy. See their report, *Security in a Changing World*, (Canada, 1994: 57-63).
- 2 The Judge Advocate General is independent of the Deputy Minister and may be independent of the Minister of National Defence also. NDA, article 9.
- 3 Letter from Brigadier-General Bruce Jeffries to his units. DND, LFC, SSF-5000-1 (Comd), 6 March 1995: 5/9.

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National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision

Douglas L. Bland

National Defence Headquarters is at the centre of defence policy making, command of the Canadian Armed Forces, and defence administration. It is simultaneously the government's instrument for controlling defence policy and for directing the armed forces. National Defence Headquarters is therefore not only a legitimate target for close investigation by anyone concerned with defence policy and operational outcomes but ought to be the critical and primary focus of their attention.

This study explores the crucial aspect of civil-military relations encompassed in the dynamic between policy making, command, and administration by focusing attention on National Defence Headquarters, the centre for defence decisions in Canada.

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