

Commission of Inquiry
into the Deployment of
Canadian Forces to Somalia



Commission d'enquête
sur le déploiement des
Forces canadiennes en Somalie

The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective Implications for the Military in a Free and Democratic Society

a study prepared for
the Commission
of Inquiry into
the Deployment of
Canadian Forces
to Somalia

Berel Rodal



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Conclusions and Observations

The Somalia events can be explained and understood on various levels, and attributed to causes of various kinds. Causation is a complex concept.¹ Clearly, beyond determining what specifically happened, and determining accountability for actions and failings, it was an important aim of the Commission of Inquiry to arrive at findings and to recommend courses of action or reflection to the government which will make the recurrence of such events and failings less likely in future.

The period since the end of the Cold War has been characterized by the advance of the ideals and institutions of market democracy in virtually all regions of the world, even if unevenly and partially in particular areas, and even if there are notable exceptions to this development. It has also been marked by the proliferation of old and new sources of conflict, a vastly enhanced capacity to inflict harm in armed conflict within and across boundaries, and by loosening constraints on armed conflict. The period has witnessed a marked increase in the use of the armed forces of the democracies in multilateral operations to contain internecine conflict, limit instability, and relieve human suffering.

The new peace operations, different in fundamental respects from classic, consensual peacekeeping, require both military muscle and subtlety; specialized preparation; and connectivity between the military, and the political and civil dimensions. Classic peacekeeping, thought of by many Canadians as something of a Canadian invention, was also viewed by the Canadian Forces as relatively undemanding, a function to be performed as a by-blow of Cold War operations and requiring no particular preparation beyond those involved in developing and deploying general-purpose combat forces. The Canadian Forces was not oriented, directed, specifically trained or led and otherwise prepared for changed conditions and needs, for new and demanding peace-support missions.

There was no development of doctrine for the new peace operations. It is doctrine which is the foundation for training soldiers for the conditions in which they will operate and for the situations they will need to confront. High morale, in turn, if it is to be a constructive force and protection against misbehaviour by soldiers, depends on having a military doctrine which fits and is seen to fit the situations soldiers face. Increasingly, these situations involve operations which are neither war nor peacekeeping, but which combine elements of both, and which have to do with asserting and protecting an international order geared to broadened applications of national interest, international security, and human rights.

While the new conditions and the missions which the military forces of the democracies are being asked to undertake imply modification in the orientation and culture of forces, of land forces in particular, it would be important not to lose sight of the fundamental purpose of the military instrument, and the continued need for this instrument and for prudent judgement.² Very few of the century's major events which brought about or threatened to bring about major changes in the political-military situation were anticipated and provided for in national or military planning, five and 10 years before they occurred. Such events would include World Wars I and II, the collapse of the Cold War divide, the Soviet Union, and Communism, and the Bosnia quagmire.

Nation states and their armed forces remain principal strategic actors. It would be imprudent to take for granted as the basis for long-term military planning a future in which all significant international actors are or have become non-ideological, pragmatic, materialistic, and liberal, and who see others as partners rather than as obstacles to their regional or global ambitions. There will continue to be potential for violent confrontations between states, and between states and peoples (and between peoples). Building international order while, ideally, depending on a balance of interests and a framework of law, depends still also on the sanction of force. There will continue to be a need for ready military power on the part of the democracies, to maintain the basis for deterrence and balance, for protecting national and alliance community interests, and for safeguarding peace, human rights, and the rule of law.

REORIENTING THE ARMED FORCES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

Other than for responding to direct threats, and the protection of important material interests, however, and perhaps in such cases, too, the use and legitimacy of armed forces have increasingly to do with engaging uni-

versal human values and with serving an international order of law and human rights.

If Canada is to continue to contribute militarily to the prevention and containment of conflict, very careful attention will need to be paid — in addition to what needs to be done to adapt policy and program to other strategic, including technological, changes — to adapting both national and military policy, and the culture, training, management, and command of the Canadian Forces, the army in particular, for the requirements of armed humanitarianism, stability and peace-support operations.

The closer co-ordination between the civil and military actors in the new peace operations, essential for effectiveness, safety, and legitimacy in the new forms of intervention, has both domestic as well as theatre-operational dimensions, with implications for the nature, demands, and requirements of soldiering, for the role of values, and for management and oversight of the military.

What emerges, at the most general level, is the need to establish the basis for firmer leadership in this regard, and for some new emphases within the military, the army in particular.

Command and Control

Canadian and defence and military authorities of other countries will need to take into account that they are likely to be called upon in future to mount non-traditional peace support operations, involving coalitions and a variety of civilian institutions and organizations. Failure to conduct these peace operations effectively can have serious consequences for those in need of help, for the international institutions and coalitions involved, for Canada, and the armed forces. Effective command and control — the exercise of authority and direction by commanders over assigned forces to accomplish a mission, combining the art and science of command of men and women and control of systems and equipment — is particularly important to success in peace operations. Over-whelming military force can sometimes make up for command and control deficiencies in warfare in ways which do not apply in peace operations.

The central requirement is that command and control arrangements provide for the diversity of military forces and civilian players typically involved in peace operations. To ensure both mission effectiveness and responsiveness, and to safeguard Canada's discrete military and political interests, command and control of military forces in peace support and enforcement missions needs:

- to be informed by careful prior planning, particularly planning based on actions to be taken in the events of a variety of patterns and contingencies;
- to be both segregated from but at the same time closely co-ordinated with, and shaped and informed by, the civil, political, and humanitarian dimensions and activities associated with the mission;
- to be connected to and supported by effective national intelligence and communications capabilities; and
- to provide for the high degree of liaison, exchanges, co-ordination, communication, and flexibility required on the part of command authorities in multinational peace support and enforcement operations.

Particular attention should be paid, as well, to ROE in command and control, training, and operational contexts, as central means of ensuring that military operations advance, serve, and are consistent with policy objectives, law, and mission and operational requirements.

Redevelopment of Military Doctrine

There needs to be redevelopment of Canadian military doctrine — the fundamental principles guiding the actions of military forces in support of national objectives — for the new strategic setting and new requirements. These call for strengthened Canadian capacities to operate as well-informed, well-trained, and capable military forces interoperable with those of allies in coalition operations, and capable of independent judgement in service of national policy, if Canada is to be involved in the new stability and peace support missions in future.

Doctrine would need to take into account the special principles and requirements of peace operations, where these differ from those of war fighting, and indeed from classic peacekeeping. A critical issue is that of drawing the boundaries and distinctions between peacekeeping operations marked by full consent on the part of the local parties, and neutrality and non-involvement on the part of the peacekeepers, strictly limited in their capacity and right to use force, and those operations involving the potential for employing compellent force, cowing opposition, imposing one's will, on the other.

In effect, this is the difference between operations authorized under Chapter VI and those authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is the author's view that thinking in terms of "Chapter VI and a half" is dangerous. It is true that conflict situations will often involve considerable ambiguity, and there will be a need for flexibility and initia-

tive on the part of international political authorities and military forces in intervening to contain and resolve them. It is important nevertheless to maintain a clear distinction in doctrine (and national policy — see below) between the orientation and posture of peacekeeping, and that of compellent peace enforcement.

Doctrine should also take into account the implications for military operations of the predominance of political and international considerations in peace operations, and the need to accommodate national, coalition, and international (e.g., UN, NATO) command authorities, and a high degree of co-ordination with a variety of civilian agencies and operations. Doctrine will need to take into account, as well, less emphasis in peace operations on a number of traditional forms of initiative, and more on adaptive control, and more emphasis on transparency, as against surprise and security. A high degree of integration of doctrine at the alliance and international level may be required.

Cultural Change

In addressing the institutional transformation and the deep changes in military and service cultures which may be required, particular attention will need to be paid to:

- the special character of the profession of arms and military organizations, and the powerful roles of established identities and cultures associated with these;
- the fact that the services must change themselves, crucial as support and guidance from civilian leadership will be;
- the centrality of vision and leadership within the forces; and
- the recognition that the process of fundamental change takes time.

More attention should be devoted by DND to the study of the armed forces themselves, as is the case in the United States particularly, treating the 'soft' side of military needs and capability. This would include study of values, stresses, cultural and social realities and trends particular to or affecting the armed forces.

Training and Operational Matters

Selection and training of personnel for peace operations should be regarded as important as selection and training for conventional military operations.

Selection and training should also provide for units able to manage the military–civil co-ordination required in peace operations. There might be a particular role for the reserves in this respect, by involving reserve officers who would have had military training and whose civilian occupations would provide the expertise and experience in needed areas.

Specific steps which could be taken to reduce the likelihood that violations of the international laws of war and Canadian law will occur in future, and the legitimacy and success of peace operations put at risk, would include:

- paying more systematic and sustained attention to instruction in the laws of warfare, integrating and emphasizing training in the laws of warfare, involving both legal and combat arms (and, ideally, combat-experienced) officers;
- in relation to the responsibilities of officers, to rate officers on their ability to produce soldiers attuned to the requirements of democracy, respect for rights, and peace operations (while able to meet what is required of them in terms of war fighting);
- integrating the laws of war element into command and control procedures — drafting doctrine, policies, and tactics with greater sensitivity to these, and improving command and control procedures for ensuring and monitoring compliance; and
- instituting more careful and systematic screening and monitoring of recruits, to identify atrocity-prone soldiers (and officers).

DND has proposed, in the 1996-97 Expenditure Plan/Report to Parliament, that the effectiveness of the Defence Services Plan should be evaluated through output and outcome measures of DND's ability to contribute to the defence of Canada, contribute to international peace, and project Canadian interests abroad.³ As part of the process, the Department is developing Business Plans,⁴ which will be required to include key results and performance indicators. These should be designed to take into account the new emphases.

Planning and Analysis

Intelligent and careful planning is critical for peace operations, as it is for other military operations. To the extent that military establishments do not think that conducting peace operations is what they ought to be doing, that it is a sideline rather than their business, there could be a disinclination to

plan for such operations. Requirements and developments might then come as a surprise. This is at least in part the story of Canadian involvement in peace operations for some years, and of the Somalia deployment.

U.S. military planners now judge that there will be significant call on armed forces for operations other than war missions in future,⁵ and that there would be benefit in better planning for these missions.⁶ An issue is determining the basis for planning and analysis. One of the findings of a recent symposium of U.S. defence analysts on Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is that greater 'granularity' is needed than for conventional military operations. In conventional military planning, the division might be the general purpose unit, and within this unit a tank unit would be the specialist unit. Armed forces know how to train a tank unit, and how to measure its readiness. In the case of OOTW, however, it may be a company which is the general purpose force, and individuals or pairs who are the specialist units.

There is need, then, for careful and systematic planning for the new types of peace operations, enabling staffs to identify requirements and constraints, and the kinds of units, including civil affairs units, critical for particular kinds of operations. Systems would then need to be developed to measure the effectiveness of such units, and the availability and readiness of civil affairs companies, and to collect data relevant to planning of the kind and types needed.

THE POLICY FRAMEWORK: THE GOVERNMENTAL AND PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSIONS

Military culture is highly particular. The changes required must come mainly from within the services. But government must provide the framework. Canadian governments for the past two decades or so have devoted little attention to defence matters, whether in relation to adapting policy and resources to changing conditions and needs, or in relation to the oversight and management of the Canadian Forces. Canadian Prime Ministers rarely visit the troops, or meet with Chiefs of the Defence Staff, other than when appointing them. There have been nine Ministers of National Defence between 1983 and 1993 and, between 1970 and 1994, perhaps one major, sustained review (in 1986-87) of defence.

Adapting the forces and military command arrangements and culture to the new requirements requires governmental (and indeed also parliamentary and broader public) reflection on strategic issues and directions for national policy with regard to military and international security affairs.

Peace operations in the new environment will need national authorities to be more sensitive to how conditions and requirements, and the demands for and on armed forces, are evolving, than has been the case for some years. Canada prided itself, in the past, on being a participant in virtually every UN and multinational peacekeeping operation mounted. There will be more of a need for judgement, in future, about whether and how to participate in an intervention, in a variety of circumstances, engaging values and interests in sometimes complex ways. There is the difficulty of risking and losing lives to save lives in conditions other than war and when national interests are not seen to be engaged.

Judgements will need to be made in terms of criteria which may be familiar, but whose application will be more problematic than before. Criteria will continue to call for answers to such question as:

- Are the goals of proposed missions clear, and are they achievable?
- Are there no other good alternatives to intervention?
- Do the cause and interests engaged justify the risks, sacrifices, and costs?
- How is Canada best able to contribute?

Other questions could be added to this list, relating to urgency, duration, etc.

Distinctions, however, will and should be drawn among the variety of missions which the Government of Canada may be invited to or feel compelled to undertake, and which it may direct the Canadian Forces to mount. The first basic distinction, again, is that between peacekeeping characterized by neutrality and a consensual environment, and peacemaking, involving compellent force. Clarifying the terms to be used and precision in using them are important conditions for the development and communication of policy on the issues of compellent interventions in support of national and international interests, international norms, and human rights. 'Intervention' itself is not a single or simple concept: as Richard Haass points out in a recent review of the issues involved in using force, "Intervention can mean different things. Military interventions differ from one another in scale, composition, duration, intensity, authority, and, above all, objective."⁷

Haass distinguishes among interventions aiming at deterrence, prevention, coercion, punishment, peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation building, interdiction, humanitarian goals, and rescue missions, in addition to war fighting, and more or less indirect forms of intervention to provide military help to one of the parties in a conflict.

The 1994 Defence White Paper affirmed Canada's determination to continue to be engaged in multilateral action to maintain and advance international security, including in consensual and nonconsensual interventions, whether under the auspices of the UN, or of NATO or the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A range of choices is set out,⁸ and criteria (called "key principles") for the selection of missions elaborated⁹ (reproduced at Appendix B). There is nevertheless a need, in the aftermath of the Somalia events and the work of the Commission, and further Canadian and international experience, including in Haiti and the aborted deployment to Zaire, for the Government of Canada to review more rigorously the choices, options, and risks for Canada involved in participating in any of the various kinds of interventions in the new conditions, to help it to choose how and when it may best contribute, selectively, to maintaining and fostering peace, stability and rights, and to help it maintain the support and understanding of the Canadian public.

There will be need, as well, for the government to better integrate the military and non-military elements and dimensions of our security and international effort. If the choice is to contribute by military means to the containment of conflict in compelling peace operations, there will be need to support the adjustment of the forces for such operations, and to be in a situation to establish responsible ROE as expressions of national policy and command, as definitive statements of Canada's commitment and role, and which serve not only to restrict, but to guide, empower, and protect. There will be need, as well, if Canada is to contribute in ways that put Canadian lives and interests and Canada's standing at risk, for an effective Canadian intelligence capability to support Canadian authorities both at home and in the field.

The 1994 Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy advanced a number of suggestions and recommendations bearing on strengthening the capacities of both the government and Parliament to treat defence issues. A modest suggestion in relation to process which may be particularly germane to the improvement of oversight and accountability is to institutionalize meetings between the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, so that they may air issues of policy and operations on a regular basis, whether once a month, or four times a year.

The Special Joint Committee advanced a number of recommendations designed to strengthen the capacity of Parliament to examine and debate military policy and operations, including recommendations to create a new

standing joint committee, and to require full parliamentary debate before deployments of Canadian Forces abroad. The recommendations of the Special Joint Committee can certainly play an important and constructive role in strengthening oversight and accountability, and in advancing the adaptation of policy and the armed forces to changing circumstances.

On their own, however, implementing the recommendations is unlikely to make up for the less salient role of the military and of defence issues in Canada in comparison with the societies with which Canadians tend to compare themselves. It may be that this will change in future as more is seen to depend on the quality of the decisions taken by Canadian governments to provide for Canada's contribution to the defence of our own interests and values, and those Canadians share with our partners and allies, in a world on the brink of the best of times, and the worst of times.

44. Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) was the product of the integration, started in 1964, of the three service HQs, each under its own Chief of Staff, into a single HQ under a single Chief of the Defence Staff. CFHQ as such lasted only eight or nine years (1964-1972/3) when the integration of military and civil staffs under the CDS and Deputy Minister took place in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).
45. Douglas Bland, *op cit.*, p. 30.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
47. Expressed to a degree in David Bercuson's book (*op. cit.*), which reflects views held by a number of members of the Forces consulted by Bercuson. The view that the murder in Somalia is the product of a weakened, corrupted military ethos and command system is a principal theme of the book.
48. Again, expressed in Bercuson's book, and in a range of military writing.
49. Bercuson, *op cit.*, p. vii.
50. A view strongly held by the senior officers and officials interviewed by the author.
51. Edward Dorn, *10 Ways to Look at the Department of Defense*. Remarks by Edward Dorn, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, March 25, 1995. Published as Vol. 10, No. 36 of the Department of Defense's *Defense Issues* series, p. 1.
52. See Peter W. Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada*, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), chapter 13, "Extraterritorial Competence", and chapter 34, "Application of Charter".
53. Board of Inquiry, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, Statement by the Board, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

CHAPTER FIVE — CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

1. Aristotle some 2,300 years ago identified four categories of causation. Using the example of the building of a house, Aristotle distinguished between the *material* cause (the stone and brick used in the building); the *efficient* cause (the activity of the builder); the formal cause (the architect's plan); and the *final* cause (the purpose to which all the activity is directed).
2. With regard to the introduction of change, Gen Sir John Hackett observed, in *The Profession of Arms*, that:
...it is the business of those in responsible positions in our armed forces today to see that modification of structure to correspond to a changing pattern in society is facilitated, while careful attention is paid to the preservation of what is worth preserving. Hackett, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
3. Canada, Department of National Defence: *1996–97 Estimates: Expenditure Plan, Government of Canada, Part III* (Ottawa, 1996), p. 34.

4. Ibid. There is a danger in overusing or misusing the term, thereby suggesting that DND is to be thought of principally as a business-engineering enterprise, whose head is naturally a CEO.
5. As evidenced by the development and publications of the new Field Manuals referred to earlier in this study, the creation of service and inter-service centres for the study and analysis of the new missions, and so on.
6. Operations research experts met January 28–30, 1997, at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida to develop analysis and modeling techniques for OOTW. Ten areas were investigated: situational awareness; impact analysis; mission definition and measures of effectiveness (MOEs); force planning and force design; determining mobility requirements; course of action (COA) development and analysis; transition planning/data tracking; communications analysis; cost analysis; and information availability/ analysis. (Military Operations Research Symposium (MORS) Workshop Agenda, 16 December 1996, and author's discussion with participating experts).
7. Richard N. Haass, "Using Force: Lessons and Choices for U.S. Foreign Policy", in Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson with Patricia Aall (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 197.
8. Canada, *1994 Defence White Paper*, op. cit., pp. 31–33.
9. Ibid., p. 29.

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Berel Rodal

This study aims to establish the broader strategic framework for the Commission's undertaking. It provides an overview of the developments in the international and domestic environment which affect the demands for and on the armed forces of Canada and other democracies, and the government's and the public's expectations of the armed forces, drawing the broad implications for governmental, defence and military policy. The author believes that the Somalia experience, including the reactions of Canadians, invites reflection on the new strategic environment, and on Canada's purposes and options; on the dimensions and significance for the armed forces of societal change, and of evolving concepts of rights and their ambit; and on the rationale and conditions for maintaining and employing armed forces on the cusp of the 21st century.

BEREL RODAL is a consultant, focusing on modernizing governance and on strategic policy issues. His professional experience as a senior official in the Government of Canada includes policy, planning and executive responsibilities in the defence, foreign affairs, international trade, security, economic and social domains, and in federal-provincial relations.

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